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Abstract—System logs constitute valuable information for
analysis and diagnosis of system behavior. The size of parallel
computing systems and the number of their components steadily
increase. The volume of generated logs by the system is in
proportion to this increase. Hence, long-term collection and
storage of system logs is challenging. The analysis of system
logs requires advanced text processing techniques. For very
large volumes of logs, the analysis is highly time-consuming and
requires a high level of expertise. For many parallel computing
centers, outsourcing the analysis of system logs to third parties
is the only affordable option. The existence of sensitive data
within system log entries obstructs, however, the transmission
of system logs to third parties. Moreover, the analytical tools for
processing system logs and the solutions provided by such tools
are highly system specific. Achieving a more general solution
is only possible through the access and analysis system of logs
of multiple computing systems. The privacy concerns impede,
however, the sharing of system logs across institutions as well
as in the public domain. This work proposes a new method
for the anonymization of the information within system logs
that employs de-identification and encoding to provide sharable
system logs, with the highest possible data quality and of reduced
size. The results presented in this work indicate that apart from
eliminating the sensitive data within system logs and converting
them into shareable data, the proposed anonymization method
provides 25% performance improvement in post-processing of
the anonymized system logs, and more than 50% reduction in
their required storage space.
I. INTRODUCTION
System logs are valuable sources of information for the
analysis and diagnosis of system behavior. The size of comput-
ing systems and the number of their components, continually
increase. The volume of generated system logs (hereafter,
syslogs) is in proportion to this increase. The storage of the
syslogs produced by large parallel computing systems in view
of their analysis requires high storage capacity. Moreover, the
existence of sensitive data within the syslogs raises serious
concerns about their storage, analysis, dissemination, and
publication. The anonymization of syslogs is a means to ad-
dress the second challenge. During the process of anonymiza-
tion, the sensitive information will be eliminated while the
remaining data is considered as cleansed data. Applying
anonymization methods to syslogs to cleanse the sensitive
data before storage, analysis, sharing, or publication, reduces
the usability of the anonymized syslogs for further analysis.
Fig. 1. The sensitivity, semantic, and length of terms in syslog entries and
their relation. Each term of a syslog entry has a non-zero length. Terms may
or may not have semantic. A term with semantic may or may not also be
sensitive.
After a certain degree of anonymization, the cleansed syslog
entries lose semantic and only remain useful for statistical
analysis, such as time series and distributions. At this stage, it
is possible to transform long syslog entries into shorter strings.
Reducing the length of cleansed and semantic-less syslog
entries significantly reduces the required storage capacity of
syslogs and addresses the storage challenge mentioned earlier.
Shortening the log entries’ length reduces their processing
complexity and, therefore, improves the performance of further
analysis on syslogs.
In this work, we address the trade-off between the sensitivity
and the usefulness of the information in anonymized syslogs.
It is important to note that the sensitivity and the semantic
of syslogs are relative terms. Each data item (or term) in a
syslog entry, depending on policies of the computing system
it originates from, may or may not be considered sensitive
data. The same degree of relativity applies to the semantic
of a syslog entry data item. Depending on the chosen data
analysis method, the semantic of syslogs can be assessed as
rich or poor. Even though the classification of each term as
sensitive or as semantic is related to the policies of computing
centers, the final assessment of sensitivity and semantic has a
binary value of true (1) or false (0). Therefore, every single
term in a syslog entry can only be sensitive or nonsensitive,
e.g., a username. Fig. 1 illustrates the relation between the
sensitivity, the semantic and the length of the syslog terms.
A triple trade-off exists between sensitivity, semantic, and
length of a syslog entry. Fig. 2 schematically illustrates this
trade-off, regardless of the system policies and syslog analysis
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Fig. 2. Trade-off scenarios between the semantic, sensitivity, and length of
a system log entry. Each of the A), B), and C) illustrations depicts the four
possible states of a syslog entry based on its sensitivity, semantic, and length.
These states are not limited to syslog entires alone and can be generalized to
higher granularities of syslog data. The green state denotes the best situation,
while the red state is most undesirable. In red states, the intention is transition
to the state shown by the yellow arrow in the trade-off diagrams. The trade-off
triangle in illustration D) shows the trade-off between the three parameters
(sensitivity, semantic, length) in a single unified view.
methods in use. The illustration shows that a syslog entry
can be in four distinct states. Green color states denote best
conditions while red color states denote undesirable condi-
tions. White color states represent neutral conditions. Under
undesirable conditions, the approach taken in this work is to
transition from the red state to one of the white states. The
yellow arrows indicate this in Fig. 2. Increasing the semantic
of a syslog entry is not possible. Therefore, the remaining
possibilities are either decreasing the sensitivity or reducing
the length of the syslog entry.
Data, in general, has a high quality when it is fit for [its]
intended uses in operations, decision making, and planning [1].
The syslog entries represent the data in this work and several
parameters affect their quality. To measure and maximize this
quality, a utility function called quality (QE) is defined as the
relation between sensitivity, semantic, length, and usefulness
of syslog entry E. The goal of this work is to maintain the
quality (QE) of all syslog entries, by pushing the parameters
mentioned above toward their best possible values, when the
computing system policies degrade this quality. The main
contribution of this work is in introducing a new approach for
anonymization that employs de-identification and encoding to
provide shareable system logs, with the highest possible data
quality and of reduced size.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In
Section II the background and current state of the art are
discussed. The proposed approach is described in Section III,
and the methodology and technical details are provided in
Section IV. After explaining the results of the current work
in Section V, the conclusion and future work directions are
discussed in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In July 2000, the European Commission adopted a decision
recognizing the ”Safe Harbor Privacy Principles” [2]. Based
on the ”Safe Harbor” agreement, eighteen personal identifiers
should be eliminated from the data before its transmission
and sharing. ”Safe Harbor” was originally designed to address
the privacy of healthcare-related information. However, its
principles are also taken into account for other types of
information.
Later, in March 2014, European Parliament approved the
new privacy legislation. According to this regulations, personal
data is defined as ”any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject.’)” [3]. This informa-
tion must remain private to ensure a person’s privacy. Based on
this definition, syslog entries contain numerous terms which
represent personal data and must, therefore, be protected.
Protection of personal data in syslog entries can be attained
via various approaches; the most common ones are encryption
and de-identification. Encryption reduces the risk of unautho-
rized access to personal data. However, the encrypted syslog
entries cannot be freely used or shared in the public domain.
The risk of disclosure of the encryption-key also remains an
important concern. In contrast, de-identification eliminates the
sensitive data and only preserves the nonsensitive (cleansed)
data. As such, de-identification provides the possibility of
sharing de-identified information in the public domain. The
de-identified data may turn out to no longer be of real use.
Pseudonymization and anonymization are two different
forms of de-identification. In pseudonymization, the sensitive
terms are replaced by dummy values to minimize the risk
of disclosure of the data subject identity. Nevertheless, with
pseudonymization the data subject can potentially be re-
identified by some additional information [4]. Anonymization,
in contrast, refers to protecting the user privacy via irreversible
de-identification of personal data.
Several tools have been developed to address the privacy
concerns of using syslog information. Most of these tools
provide log encryption as the main feature, while certain such
tools also provide de-identification as an additional feature.
Syslog-ng and Rsyslog are two open-source centralized log-
ging infrastructures that provide out of the box encryption and
message secrecy for syslogs, as well as de-identification of
syslog entries [5], [6]. Both tools provide a pattern database
feature, which can identify and rewrite personal data based on
pre-defined text patterns. Logstash [7] is another open-source
and reliable tool to parse, unify, and interpret syslog entries.
Logstash provides a text filtering engine which can search for
the text patterns in live streams of syslog entries and replace
them with predefined strings [8]. In addition to the off-line
tools, such as Syslog-ng and Logstash, there is a growing
number of on-line tools, e.g., Loggy [9], Logsign [10], and
Scalyr [11], that offer a comprehensive package of syslog
analysis services. The existence of sensitive data in the syslogs,
barricades the usage of such services.
Alongside these industrial-oriented tools, several research
groups have developed scientific-oriented toolkits to address
the syslog anonymization challenge. eCPC toolkit [12], sdcMi-
cro [13], TIAMAT [14], ANON [15], UTD Anonymization
Toolbox [16], and Cornell Anonymization Toolkit [17] are
selected examples of such toolkits. These tools apply various
forms of k-anonymity [4] and l-diversity [18] to ensure data
anonymization. Achieving an optimal k-anonymity is an NP-
hard problem [19]. Heuristic methods, such as k-Optimize, can
provide effective results [20].
The main challenges of using existing anonymization ap-
proaches, in general, are: (1) The quality of the anonymized
data dramatically degrades, and (2) The size of the anonymized
syslogs remains almost unchanged. The industrial-oriented
approaches are unable to attain full anonymization at micro-
data [4] level. Even though scientific-oriented approaches can
guarantee a high level of anonymization, they are mainly
not capable of applying effective anonymization in an online
manner. Certain scientific-oriented methods, such as [21],
which can effectively anonymize online streams of syslogs,
need to manipulate log entries at their origin [22].
The anonymization approach proposed in this work is dis-
tinguished from existing work through the following features:
(1) Ability to work with streams of syslogs without modi-
fication of the syslog origin; (2) Preservation of the highest
possible quality of log entries; and (3) Reduction of the syslogs
storage requirements, whenever possible.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
Computing systems can generate system logs in various
formats. RFC5424 proposes a standard for the syslog protocol
which is widely accepted and used on computing systems [23].
According to this protocol, all syslog entries consist of two
main parts: a timestamp and a message. In addition to these
two main parts, there are optional parts, such as system
tags. Let us consider the following sample syslog entry E1:
”1462053899 Accepted publickey for Siavash from
4.3.2.1”. In this entry, ”1462053899” is the timestamp
and the rest of the line ”Accepted publickey for
Siavash from 4.3.2.1” is the message. In the message
part, the terms Accepted, publickey, for, and from
are constant terms, while Siavash, and 4.3.2.1 are
variable terms, in the sense that for the above constant terms,
the user name and IP can vary among users and machines.
The goal of this work, described earlier in Section I,
is to preserve the quality of syslog entries throughout the
anonymization process. To achieve this goal, (1) The variable
terms in the syslog entries are divided into 3 groups: sensitive,
meaningful (those that have a semantic), and semantic-less
terms. (2) The sensitive terms are eliminated to comply with
the privacy policies. (3) The semantic-less terms are replaced
with predefined constants to reduce the required storage.
(4) Following the anonymization steps (2) and (3) above,
every syslog entry that does not have any additional variable
terms, is mapped to a hash-key, via a collision-resistant hash
function. This step is called encoding. (5) The quality of the
remaining syslog entries is measured with a utility function.
(6) When it is revealed that removing a meaningful term from
the syslog entry improves the quality of syslog, that particular
term is replaced with a predefined constant. (7) The remaining
processed syslog entries that do not contain additional variable
terms, are mapped into hash-keys (similar to step (4) above).
(8) Upon completion of steps (4) and (7), the hash-key codes
can be optimized based on their frequency of appearance. The
preliminary results of analyzing the syslogs of a production
HPC system called Taurus1 using the proposed approach
shows up to 95% reduction in storage capacity [24]. An
interactive demonstration of the use of this anonymization
approach on a sample syslog is provided online [25].
In the proposed approach, regular expressions are used for
the automatic detection of variable terms within syslog entries.
Categorization of automatically detected terms into sensitive
and/or meaningful is performed based on the information in
Table II. This information is inferred from the policies and
conditions of the host high-performance computing system.
Automatically detected variable terms which do not belong to
any of the sensitive and meaningful categories are considered
as semantic-less. A variable length hash algorithm is used to
encode the syslog entries. The encoding step is described in
greater details at the end of this section.
Table I contains fifteen main regular expressions (out of
thirty-eight) which are used to detect variable terms in syslog
entries. The order of their application is significant since
certain patterns are subsets of other patterns. Even though
most variables can be detected with these regular expressions,
in an unlikely case of similarity between variables and con-
stants, the regular expression may not be able to differentiate
between constants and variables correctly. For example the
username panic may be misinterpreted as a constant value
like kernel panic. In such scenarios, the undetected variables
are considered as constants (or vice versa) and appear as a
new event pattern. Encoding event patterns in the final step of
the proposed approach guarantees the highest attainable level
of anonymization.
As the first step, the quality of syslog entries needs to be
quantified. The product of four characteristics of syslog entries
defines the syslog entry quality: (1) sensitivity, (2) semantic,
(3) length, and (4) usefulness. To render uniform the impact of
all characteristics, their significance is normalized in the range
of 0 to 1, and the negative parameters are replaced with their
reverse positive counterparts. Therefore, the effective param-
eters are nonsensitivity, semantic, reduction, and usefulness.
The nonsensitivity parameter of a syslog entry can take any
value in the range of 0 (most sensitive) to 1 (most nonsensitive)
denoting the best value. The parameter semantic can also take
any value in the range of 0 (least semantic) to 1 (highest
semantic), with 1 representing a highly relevant syslog entry.
The length of syslog entries can be interpreted as the size
of syslog entry. The reduction of syslog entries size may
also take any value in the range of 0 (no reduction) to 1
(most reduction). Size reduction can be achieved via any
1https://doc.zih.tu-dresden.de/hpc-wiki/bin/view/Compendium/SystemTaurus
TABLE I
THE VARIABLE TERMS IN THE TAURUS SYSLOGS CAN BE DETECTED WITH
THIRTY-EIGHT REGULAR EXPRESSIONS. OUT OF THOSE, THE MAIN
FIFTEEN MACHINE-INDEPENDENT REGULAR EXPRESSIONS ARE SHOWN
HERE. THESE CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY THE VARIABLE TERMS WITHIN
SYSLOGS FROM ANY COMPUTING SYSTEM.
Variable type Regular expression
Path ([\(\s\,\>\:\=])([\/][a-z0-9_\.\-\:]*)+
Version ([\w\.\-]+x86_64)
Email ([a-z0-9_\-\.]+@([a-z0-9_-]+\.)+[a-z]+)
DateTime (\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2})T(\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})
IPv4 (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)
Port ([\W])(port \d+)
Parameter (\$[a-z0-9_]+)
URID (uid=[\w\-]+)
User (for )((user\ )*[a-z0-9_-]+)
Library ([a-z0-9_\-]+\.so(\.\d*)*)
Hardware address (0[x][a-f0-9]+\-0[x][a-f0-9]+)
Hex Number (0[x][a-f0-9]+)
Percentage (\d+\.*[\d]*\%)
Serial number ((\s)([a-f0-9\.\-]+\:)+(\s))
Size ([ˆa-z0-9])(\d+[bkmg])([ˆa-z0-9])
general lossy or lossless compression algorithm. When the
applied compression method does not change the semantic
and sensitivity of syslog entries, it is considered as lossless
(from the perspective of this work). If the chosen compression
method modifies the semantic or sensitivity of syslog entries,
in the context of this work, it is taken as an additional
level of anonymization rather that compression. A careful
consideration of various effective compression algorithms,
including Brotli, Deflate, Zopfli, LZMA, LZHAM, and Bzip2,
revealed that in affordable time, compression could reduce the
data size to 25% of its original size. Therefore the reduction
of syslogs ranges between 0.75 to 1, where 1 indicates 100%
compression and is practically impossible to reach. Every time
that a compressed syslog entry is processed, the decompression
process imposes an additional performance penalty on the host
system. Therefore, the proposed approach in this work uses an
encoding algorithm instead of compression algorithms which
demand a decompression before accessing the compressed
data. The encoded data can be accessed and used without pre-
processing.
Unlike the previous three parameters, the fourth parameter,
usefulness, is boolean and takes 0 or 1 as values. The value of
0 or 1 for usefulness denotes that a syslog entry in its current
from cannot or can be used for a specific type of analysis,
respectively.
QE = UE ∗ (n ∗NE) ∗ (s ∗ SE) ∗ (r ∗RE) (1)
Equation (1) quantifies the quality (QE) of a syslog entry
E as a product of its nonsensitivity (NE), semantic (SE),
reduction (RE), and usability (UE). The coefficients, n, s,
and r indicate the importance of nonsensitivity, semantic, and
reduction for a specific computing system. The default value
for n, s, and r is 1. The value of 0 for usability results in
a 0-quality syslog entry and disqualifies the current syslog
entry from further analysis. As explained earlier, regardless
of system conditions and policies, a reduction rate of 75% is
always achievable [26]–[29]. Therefore, the quality of a raw
syslog entry is calculated using Equation (2).
QE = 1 ∗ (1 ∗NE) ∗ (1 ∗ SE) ∗ (1 ∗ 0.75) (2)
The sensitivity of each syslog entry term is defined based
on the policies set up by the computing system administra-
tors. Assume that Table II indicates the sensitivity and the
semantic of syslog entry terms of a computing system. The
severity degree of each term’s sensitivity varies from 0 to
10. This degree is only used to give priority to the individual
anonymization steps. Each syslog entry term can be sensitive
(Y) or nonsensitive (N). Therefore, in this section, only the
boolean sensitivity indicator (Y/N) is considered to denote the
sensitivity of each syslog entry term. The same assumptions
hold for the semantic of each syslog entry term. Accordingly,
each term can be with or without semantic. The semantic of
each term can be judged from 3 sources. (1) Every sensitive
term is also semantic. (2) Every semantic term is marked with
”Y” in the semantic table (Table II), (3) All terms not included
in the semantic table nor marked with ”Y” therein simply have
length, are nonsensitive, and have no semantic.
Table III indicates the sensitivity and semantic of each term
from the message part of the sample syslog entry based on
information from Table II.
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION OF SYSLOG ENTRY TERMS INTO SENSITIVE AND/OR
SEMANTIC. SEVERITY DENOTES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE RESPECTIVE TERMS.
Term Sensitivity Severity
User Name Y 10
IP Address Y 08
Port Number Y 01
Node Name Y 03
Node ID Y 03
Public Key Y 10
App Name N 00
Path / URL N 00
Term Semantic Severity
accept* Y 07
reject* Y 10
close* Y 08
*connect* Y 09
start* Y 02
*key* Y 01
session Y 07
user* Y 05
TABLE III
A SAMPLE SYSLOG ENTRY. SENSITIVE AND MEANINGFUL TERMS ARE
MARKED WITH ”Y” IN THE RESPECTIVE ROWS.
Message Accepted publickey for Siavash from 4.3.2.1
Sensitive - - - Y - Y
Semantic Y Y - Y - Y
The nonsensitivity (NE) of a syslog entry E is defined
as Number of nonsensitive terms in entry ETotal number of terms in entry E . The semantic (SE) of a
syslog entry E is defined as Number of terms with semantic in entry ETotal number of terms in entry E .
Calculating these properties for the sample syslog entry E1
from Table III, with the information from Table II, results
in: NE1 =
4
6 and SE1 =
4
6 , respectively. The quality of the
sample syslog (QE1 ) is then obtained with Equation (2) to be
QE1 = 1 ∗ 46 ∗ 46 ∗ 0.75 ≈ 0.33. The steps for performing a
full anonymization with the proposed approach on the sample
syslog entry E1 from Table III are shown in Table IV.
The encoding algorithm used in this work is the
variable length hash algorithm SHAKE-128 [30],
TABLE IV
ANONYMIZATION AND ENCODING (HASHING) OF THE SAMPLE SYSLOG
ENTRY FROM TABLE III.
A)
Message Accepted publickey for Siavash from 4.3.2.1
Sensitive - - - Y - Y
Semantic Y Y - Y - Y
QE1 = 1 ∗ 0.67 ∗ 0.67 ∗ 0.75 ≈ 0.33
B) Anon. #1 Accepted publickey for #USR# from 4.3.2.1Sensitive - - - - - Y
Semantic Y Y - - - Y
QE1 = 1 ∗ 0.83 ∗ 0.50 ∗ 0.75 ≈ 0.31
C) Anon. #2 Accepted publickey for #USR# from #IP4#Sensitive - - - - - -
Semantic Y Y - - - -
QE1 = 1 ∗ 1.00 ∗ 0.33 ∗ 0.75 ≈ 0.25
D) Anon. #3 Accepted #KEY# for #USR# from #IP4#Sensitive - - - - - -
Semantic Y - - - - -
QE1 = 1 ∗ 1.00 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.75 ≈ 0.125
E) SHAKE-128 caa5002dSensitive - - - - - -
Semantic Y - - - - -
QE1 = 1 ∗ 1.00 ∗ 1.00 ∗ 0.81 ≈ 0.81
[31] with 32-bit output length adjustable based on
the system requirements. All syslog entries that
follow the pattern of the sample syslog entry E1:
”Accepted publickey for Siavash from 4.3.2.1”,
regardless of the values which they carry, after
‘constantification’ are identical to: ”Accepted publickey
for #USR# from #IP4#”. This string is an event pattern.
Event patterns are constant strings with a certain semantic
meaning. Replacing them with a shorter identifier does not
change their meaning, as long as the identifier replacing a
particular event pattern is known. Therefore, in this work,
a hashing function is used to transform event patterns from
syslogs into shorter single-term identifiers. Using a hashing
function guarantees that an event pattern is always converted
to an identical identifier (hash-key). The identifier (hash-
key) carries the same semantic as the event pattern, in an
8-character string. The identifier ”caa5002d” in comparison
with the original string of ”Accepted publickey for Siavash
from 4.3.2.1” with 43 characters, represents an 81% decrease
in the string length. Apart from shortening the syslog entries,
using identifiers also reduces the number of terms in each
syslog entry, which in turn, results in significant performance
improvement of further processing of syslog entries.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We selected a thirteen-month collection of syslogs between
February 01, 2016 and February 28, 2017, from the Taurus
production HPC cluster as the source of information in the
present study. Taurus is a Linux-based parallel cluster with
2014 computing nodes. It employs Slurm [32] as its batch
system. Taurus’ 2014 computing nodes are divided into six
islands, mainly based on their processing units type: CPUs
(Intel’s Haswell, Sandy Bridge, Triton, Westmere), and GPUs.
The thirteen-month collection includes syslog entries from
all 2014 Taurus computing nodes. The syslog daemons on the
computing nodes are configured to submit syslog entries to a
central node. The central node, in turn, sends the entries to a
syslog storage node. On this storage node, daily syslog entries
are accumulated according to their origin into different log files.
Therefore, the thirteen-month collection includes 2014 system
log files per day (one log file for each computing node).
The number of syslog entries generated by a computing
node per day depends on various factors, including system
updates and node failures. For the thirteen-month period of
this study, approximately 984.26GiB of syslogs were collected,
which comprise 8.6 billion syslog entries. Fig. 3 illustrates
the distribution of syslog entries among the first 100 nodes of
each island. A row in an island indicates a node and a column
represents a full month period between February 2016 and
March 2017.
Various causes, such as scheduled maintenance or node
failures, are responsible for a certain percentage of errors
during the collection of syslog entries. The completeness of
the syslog collection process can be measured by considering
the presence of a log file as the indicator of the gathering of
syslog entries from a particular node on a given day. Based
on this definition, the syslog collection completeness for the
specific time interval in this work is 97%. The red lines in
Fig. 4 indicate the 3% of missed (uncollected) syslogs.
Most of the missing 3% syslog entries have been lost
over the course of three days, marked at the top of Fig. 4
with letters A, B, and C. The reasons for their occurrence
was (A) scheduled maintenance, (B) reaction of automatic
overheating protection mechanism, and (C) failure of the
central syslog collection node.
V. RESULTS
The proposed anonymization approach has been applied to
a thirteen-month collection of Taurus syslog entries. During
this process, the sensitivity and semantic of each term needed
to be identified based upon the policies of Taurus HPC cluster.
According to the user privacy and data protection act of the
Center for Information Services and High Performance Computing,
at the Technical University of Dresden (TUD), Germany, HPC
system usage information may be anonymously collected from
the users and shared with research partners. This information
includes, yet is not limited to, various metrics about pro-
cessors, networks, storage systems, and power supplies [33].
Other types of information are processed according to the
IT [34] and identity management [35] regulations of TUD.
Based on these regulations, certain data are considered sen-
sitive and must, therefore, remain confidential [36]. To the
best of our knowledge, the information in Table V captures
Fig. 3. The number of syslog entries per node, per month. In each island, a column represents (from left to right) a month between February 2016 and March
2017. A row denotes a computing node in each island. The intersection between rows (nodes) and columns (months) is called a cell. The heat color within a
cell illustrates the relative number of syslog entries for a particular node in a specific month.
Fig. 4. Illustration of the syslog entries collection gaps. Approximately 3% of
the syslog entries collected over thirteen months were not correctly recorded.
The data loss occurred at three distinct points in time, identified as three
vertical lines. The causes of this data loss are (A) scheduled maintenance,
(B) reaction of automatic overheating protection mechanism, and (C) failure
of the central syslog collection node.
the data sensitivity according to the TUD privacy regulation
in force. From this Table V, one can note that certain syslog
entry terms, such as node names or port numbers, may remain
unchanged. The use of the proposed approach on 8.6 billion
syslog entries from Taurus of an uncompressed size of 985
GiB, according to the TUD privacy regulations revealed seven
facts.
(1) Only approximately 35% of the syslog terms are sensi-
tive and need to be anonymized. Therefore approximately 65%
TABLE V
SYSLOG ENTRY SENSITIVITY ACCORDING TO THE TUD PRIVACY
REGULATIONS
Term Sensitivity Severity
Surname Y 10
Firstname Y 10
Title Y 10
User type (employee, student, guest) Y 10
User name Y 10
Password Y 10
Login status (active, disabled) Y 10
User ID (identification of Unix users) Y 10
Home (Path to home directory) Y 10
Shell (default shell) Y 10
Group ID (belonging to Unix groups) Y 10
Mail addresses (TUD addresses) Y 10
IP Address Y 08
Port Number N 00
Node Name N 00
Node ID N 00
Public Key Y 08
App Name N 00
Path / URL Y 01
of terms remained untouched (Fig. 5).
(2) The anonymization of sensitive terms has less than 0.5%
impact on syslog size reduction.
(3) The quality of most entries degraded post-
anonymization.
(4) Approximately 2, 000 unique event patterns were
discovered.
(5) More than 90% of syslog entries are based on 40 event
patterns (hereafter frequent patterns). All other non-frequent
Fig. 5. Percentage of sensitive and nonsensitive terms within the thirteen-
month-long collection of syslogs. The red bars indicate the percentage of
sensitive terms while the green bars indicate the percentage of nonsensitive
terms. The sensitive terms sum up to approximately 35% of all terms in the
collection.
event patterns together are responsible for less than 10% of
syslog entries. For instance, more than 15% of the syslog
entries have the (#USER#) cmd (#PATH#) pattern.
(6) A small percentage of syslog entries (approxi-
mately 5%) among the non-frequent event patterns do not
contain any variable terms in their original form (e.g.,
disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint).
(7) According to the current TUD privacy regula-
tions, almost all syslog entries lose their added seman-
tic after anonymization (e.g., ”failed password for #USER#
from #IPv4# port 32134 ssh2”).
The only remaining useful information in these cases is the
semantic of the event pattern itself. For the above example,
the useful semantic is that authentication via ssh failed.
Based on the above seven observations about syslog entries on
Taurus, we can state that: (1) The anonymized syslogs consist
of approximately 90% semantic-less entries (after mandatory
anonymization), (2) Approximately 5% of the entries are
constant, that is they do not have any variable terms, and
approximately 5% are entries with semantic (and retained
their useful properties even after anonymization). Following
the necessary anonymization, (90 + 5)% of syslog entries no
longer have semantic and can be converted to hash-keys. The
5% of syslog entries which carry added semantic even after
anonymization, should remain untouched.
The Table VI illustrates a sample of four syslog entries
in three different stages of anonymization. The Table VII
is a reference to the meaning of each of the hash keys.
Together with the anonymized syslogs and according to the
privacy regulations, the information in Table VII may also be
fully/partially published.
The data in part (B) of Table VI follow the main anonymiza-
tion guidelines. This fact enables their inclusion in the present
work. However, since syslog entries lengths have been re-
duced, the data in part (C) of Table VI delivers the very same
semantic as part (B), at a much smaller length.
The usefulness of the anonymized and hashed information
from the thirteen-month syslog collection remains identical.
Reprocessing the results from an earlier work [37], in which
the correlation of failures in Taurus was analyzed, via the
new anonymization and encoding approach led to identical
TABLE VI
ANONYMIZATION AND HASHING OF FOUR SYSLOG ENTRIES
(A) Before anonymization
1 (siavash) cmd (/home/siavash/config.sh > output.stat)
2 pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for siavash
3 disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
4 ACPI: LAPIC (acpi_id[0x55] lapic_id[0xff] disabled)
(B) After anonymization, before hashing
1 (#USER#) cmd (#PATH# > output.stat)
2 pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for #USER#
3 disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
4 ACPI: LAPIC (acpi_id[0x55] lapic_id[0xff] disabled)
(C) After anonymization and hashing
1 1808e388
2 0964de42
3 59f2da35
4 ACPI: LAPIC (acpi_id[0x55] lapic_id[0xff] disabled)
TABLE VII
HASH-KEY REFERENCE TABLE
Hash-key Meaning
1808e388 A command executed by user
0964de42 A user logged out
59f2da35 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
outcomes. Moreover, due to single-term syslog entries, the
processing time was approximately 25% shorter than before.
VI. CONCLUSION
System logs have widely been used in various domains,
from system monitoring and performance analysis to failure
prediction of different system components. Even though sys-
tem logs are mainly system dependent, having knowledge
about various computing systems improves the general un-
derstanding of computing systems behavior. However, due
to the vast amount of personal data among the system log
entries, users privacy concern impedes the free circulation
and publication of system logs. In this work, we examined
the trade-off between sensitivity and semantic of system logs.
Since after a certain level of anonymization the semantic of
system logs may be lost, keeping the semantic-less data is not
the best practice.
This work introduced quality, the system logs utility func-
tion, as a measurable parameter calculated based on nonsen-
sitivity, semantic, reduction, and usefulness of system logs.
The goal is to maintain the quality of system log, by pushing
all effective parameters to their possible limit. This proposed
approach has been applied on a thirteen-month collection of
Taurus HPC cluster system logs, between from February 01,
2016 and February 28, 2017. The proposed anonymization
approach can guarantee full anonymization of syslog entries
via the final encoding step. Apart from the highest degree of
anonymization, a total reduction of more than 50% in system
log size as well as 25% performance improvement in system
log analysis is achievable.
The current hashing function produces larger hash-keys
than required to avoid hash-key collisions. Fine tuning of the
hashing function according to the computing system require-
ments, together with improving the variable term detection,
are planned as future work.
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